Medical Data De-ID A Canadian Perspective

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Session 3: International session (40 min) Chairperson Founder @ SapienSecure.io
University of British Columbia
Cardiovascular Radiologist



Disclosures



A healthcare intelligence company.

Focused on Medical Data Indexing, Extracting and De-ID.

Many of the examples and tools discussed in this presentation are from using SapienSecure v2 software.

In the news...



NEWS

Top Stories

Local

Climate

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Nova Scotia

Privacy commissioner calls for changes at N.S. Health after staff found snooping













Health authority issues apology, says it plans to accept most recommendations



Josefa Cameron · CBC News · Posted: Feb 08, 2023 9:25 AM PST | Last Updated: February 8

FASKI

 having all employees, consultants, and sub-contractors sign confidentiality contracts prohibiting data linking and/or re-identification;

De-

only allowing authorized staff to access and use data on a "need-to-know" basis;

 ensuring all employees, consultants, and sub-contractors working with the data receive adequate privacy and security training;

Hea

 developing and maintaining data privacy, security, and usage standard operating procedures that specifically prohibit re-identification;

JUNE 2, 20

- developing and maintaining strictly enforced retention, destruction and storage policies;
- developing and maintaining role-based data access policies and processes, which are enforced and periodically audited;
- maintaining records of all signed data-sharing agreements and confidentiality agreements, and making those available to the data custodian on request;
- maintaining a proactive program for monitoring privacy, confidentiality and security polices and procedures, a mandatory and on-going training program for all individuals, and a breach protocol that is regularly updated and tested;
- ensuring that external and internal privacy reviews and audits are regularly conducted and that any identified gaps are mitigated; and
- prohibiting data linking and re-identification.

Canadian Association of Radiologists White Paper on De-Identification of Medical Imaging: Part 1, General Principles

Canadian Association of Radiologists' Journal 2021, Vol. 72(1) 13-24 © The Author(s) 2020 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/0846537120967349 journals.sagepub.com/home/caj



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Abstract

The application of big data, radiomics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms in radiology requires access to large data sets containing personal health information. Because machine learning projects often require collaboration between


Canadian Association of Radiologists White Paper on De-identification of Medical Imaging: Part 2, Practical Considerations

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Medical Data and the Patient Journey



De-identification

Process of transforming direct and indirect identifiers, and possibly implementing additional controls so that the **likelihood** of data subjects being correctly identified from the information is **very small** under the circumstances of use or disclosure.

Anonymization

Process of permanently removing all protected health information from the data set.

Encryption

Process of using a computer algorithm to obfuscate the patient information, making it unintelligible and random looking. The original information can be recovered using a decryption algorithm.

Pseudonymization

Process of transforming direct identifiers and possibly implementing additional controls so that data subjects cannot be correctly identified from the information under the circumstances of the use or disclosure.

Classifying Variables

Direct identifiers

Patient health number

Accession number

Medical images

Registration number

City

Medical registration number

Postal code

Phone number

Hospital

Name

Date of birth

Indirect identifiers

Sex

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) clause 164.514

"risk is very small that the information could be used, alone or in combination with other reasonably available information, by an anticipated recipient to identify an individual."



individual

Name Address (geography smaller than state) Any specific date **Telephone numbers** Fax number **Email address Social Security Number** Medical record number Health plan beneficiary number **Account number** Certificate or license number Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers **Device identifiers and serial numbers** Web URL **Internet Protocol (IP) Address** Finger or voice print Photographic images Any other characteristic that could uniquely identify the Personal Information Privacy and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) applies to private-sector organizations across Canada that collect, use or disclose personal information in the course of a commercial activity.




Under PIPEDA, personal information includes any factual or subjective information, recorded or not, about an identifiable individual. This includes information in any form, such as:


- age, name, ID numbers, income, ethnic origin, or blood type;
- opinions, evaluations, comments, social status, or disciplinary actions; and
- employee files, credit records, loan records, medical records, existence of a dispute between a consumer and a merchant, intentions (for example, to acquire goods or services, or change jobs).

Not Identifiable Data (Probability=ø)





Assessing Risks of Re-identification



Prosecutor risk assumes that an adversary is informed of the individuals within a data set.


'For example, if a teenager's parents know that their child has participated in a survey and the results are to be released in de-identified form, the risk of the parents attempting to re-identify their child's responses would qualify as prosecutor risk.

Journalist risk assumes that the adversary does not know whose data are in the data set, thus the risk of this assessment is significantly decreased.

For example, "if only a sample of de-identified rows from an original data set is released, this would qualify as journalist risk."

Because terminology has been somewhat inconsistent across statutes and in general use within jurisdictions, it is most useful to focus on the concept of identification risk as follows. This risk consists of 2 criteria: (a) the ability to correctly match a record to a real person, and (b) by doing so learn something new about that person.

Step 1.



STUDY DESCRIPTION

report Anatomy



STUDY DATE

Step 2.

De-Identification Processes

Hand-writing Redaction

Image Defacing

Date Shift Consistency Image Burnt-in Text Redaction

Medical Record
Consistency

Differential Privacy

PHI NLP

K- Anonymity

Forms OCR Redaction

DICOM De - ID

Medical Record Value Consistency PatientID Gen

The unique identifiers, dates, and locations are not usually important specifically in research. But in relationship to other records in the dataset they can be essential to the success of the project.

Medical Record Number or Date consistency software can help create safe datasets that retain value.

PatientID	Gender	Age	Zip code	Test
55998	M	19	15723	Negative
88557	F	35	15674	Positive
55868	F	35	15674	Positive
44551	M	45	15623	Negative
58524	M	45	15623	Negative
25584	\mathbf{F}	61	15633	Negative
58744	\mathbf{F}	61	15643	Positive
87524	M	19	15762	Positive
87384	M	19	15762	Negative
17583	F	19	15762	Positive


M: male; F: female


Image De-Facing

Multi-planar (CT and MRI) hold enough spacial information to reconstruct the face of the patient.

Many big data projects are focused on neuro-based problems and require imaging.

Simple defacing algorithms exist open source, and from businesses that will automate this.





Answers: 1) a-f-g. 2) b-d-i. 3) c-e-h.

Burnt-in Text Redaction





PHI NLP

Medical Reports are treasure troves of medical information that can be game changing for a bigdata project.

Extraction of information from reports should not compromise privacy.

PHI NLP is becoming more and more common, and with transformers, can be extremely accurate. Can be locally trained and re-trained at institutions to improve accuracy over time.






gh with nght sided chest pain, and went to an urgent care center Chest x ray revealed

Differential Privacy

Enough Indirect Identifiers in Combination Can Directly Identify an Individual

Name	Postal code	Age	Sex	Dx
Jacquie	S7A 4D1	23	F	Pneumonia
Patricia	S7A 2X2	27	F	Pneumonia
George	A4T 1D7	18	М	COVID-19
Albert	A4T 4E3	13	М	Pneumonia
Sienna	S7A 1G7	25	F	COVID-19




Hand-writing Redaction

Hand writing is one of the more challenging data-mineable sources, and littered with personal information.

My research projects focus on identifying and removing this data.

There are simple software tools that can analyze files and detect the presence of handwriting.



Final words...

- True healthcare improvements will occur with increased mobility and movement of medical data.
- Patient privacy does NOT need to be compromised.
- Technology exists to export, aggregate and de-ID medical data almost instantly, and more organizations need to adopt these tools to empower innovation.

THANK YOU

Questions?

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